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ABSTRACT 
 We introduce a simulation model to evaluate the disruptions, delays, and 
incremental costs inflicted on the U.S. West Coast container shipping industry by a 
Transportation Security Incident (TSI).  Each year, more than 6,000 container ships call 
upon West Coast seaports handling in excess of 18.3 million containers.  Current national 
directives do not specify uniform standards for measuring the amount of seaport cargo-
handling capacity, nor decision rules to divert cargo to alternate facilities when a primary 
destination is degraded or unusable.  Through analysis, we identify infrastructure 
components that are potential bottlenecks and/or vulnerable to a TSI that can potentially 
threaten the U.S. maritime shipping capacity.  For example, we demonstrate a 10-day 
labor union dispute and longshoremen work stoppage that paralyzes the entire U.S. West 
Coast.  The incident induces significant port congestion from Puget Sound to San Pedro 
Bay, reducing the annual West Coast vessel and import container throughput by 3 percent 
(174 vessels and 237,088 containers), and increases the incremental costs suffered by 
ocean carriers by $400 million.  Additional analysis identifies opportunities for 
commercial and government investment in additional seaport infrastructure to alleviate 
West Coast port congestion, while ensuring the unimpeded continuity of operations of 
West Coast shipping subsequent to a TSI. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 The United States economy, national security and the American way of life are 
critically dependent upon the efficient, effective and unimpeded movement of cargoes via 
our nation’s seaports and the Marine Transportation System (MTS).  Each year, 
approximately 6,000 ocean carriers make 90,000 port calls to U.S. seaports and carry 95 
percent of the international trade transiting North America.  Similarly, 90 percent of 
American manufactured and export goods move intermodally to our nation’s seaports and 
contribute in excess of $800 billion annually to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Of 
particular importance to our economic security is the vitality of the West Coast container 
shipping industry.  Seven major West Coast seaports (Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, 
Oakland, Los Angeles, Long Beach and San Diego) account for approximately 40 percent 
and in excess of $443 billion of total U.S. waterborne trade annually.  In addition, these 
seaports handle more than 50 percent of the entire U.S. waterborne foreign container 
trade, more than the combined efforts of East and Gulf Coast seaports.  Because of this 
demonstrated economic importance of our West Coast seaports, it is imperative that their 
operations remain uninterrupted. 
 A Transportation Security Incident (TSI) is any natural or human-caused event 
that results in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system or 
economic disruption in a particular area.  A TSI such as a terrorist attack or natural 
disaster incapacitating one or more of our seaports can inflict a severe ripple effect on 
other modes of transportation, as well as have adverse economic or national  
security effects. 
Current national maritime directives do not specify uniform standards for 
measuring domestic seaport cargo-handling capacity nor decision rules to divert cargo to 
alternate facilities when a primary destination is rendered unusable or degraded 
subsequent to a TSI.  In the aftermath of such an event, the operational decisions to divert 
cargo to alternate sites will be based upon real-time information obtained by the shippers 
about the current status of seaports and intermodal systems.  Because a majority of 
shipping industry assets are privately owned and operated, government officials are 
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restricted from directing the private shipping industry how to operate their vessels 
subsequent to a TSI.  However, we assume shippers will respond to minimize their costs 
and schedule disruptions. 
 We present a multistage simulation called the Container Port Simulation Model 
(CPSM) to evaluate the disruptions, delays and additional costs inflicted on the U.S.  
West Coast container shipping industry by a TSI.  We implement CPSM with the Arena 
simulation software and devise a set of six hypothetical TSI scenarios.  Our objectives, 
first to identify and quantify the disruption and incremental costs following a TSI, and 
then to identify which infrastructure components are potential bottlenecks and/or 
vulnerable to a TSI that threatens our maritime shipping capacities. 
We implement CPSM and successfully identify seaport and intermodal areas that 
are potential bottlenecks and vulnerable to a TSI.  Our results reveal the insufficiency of 
existing West Coast infrastructure to accommodate a simultaneous interruption of 
operations at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 14 days, ports that account for 
nearly 70 percent of the total West Coast volume.  Such an event also exacerbates coastal 
congestion enough to degrade the annual West Coast volume by 2% (61 ships and 
162,242 containers) and cost shippers in excess of $439 million beyond normal expenses.  
Another scenario identifies a 10-day labor union dispute as the single most disruptive 
threat to West Coast shipping that  degrades annual coastal throughput by 3% (174 ships 
and 237,088) and assesses shippers $400 million in incremental costs.  CPSM does not 
take into account the economic impact on local, national and global economies.  Lastly, 
we are able to identify the value of additional investment in West Coast seaport 
infrastructure (by commercial and government entities) that could alleviate West Coast 
congestion and ensure the continuity of operations of the West Coast shipping industry 
subsequent to a TSI. 
CPSM provides commercial and government maritime agencies a baseline model 
to identify and quantify the disruption, congestion and incremental costs incurred to 
ocean carriers in the aftermath of maritime incident.  In addition, CPSM provides a new 
database of our nation’s West Coast container port volumes and capacities.  By altering 
model parameters, such as vessel characteristics and interarrival and service times, as 
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well as seaport and intermodal infrastructures and capacities, CPSM can assist planners 
to identify carrier, port or other coastal vulnerabilities and determine where tradeoffs and 
investments can be made to mitigate TSI vulnerabilities. 
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A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis introduces a simulation model to identify and measure the effects of 
congestion at container ports on the West Coast of the United States and shipper costs 
subsequent to a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) upon the these ports and the 
Marine Transportation System (MTS).  The Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA) of 2002, a program designed to ensure greater security for United States 
seaports, defines a TSI as “a security incident that results in a significant loss of life, 
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a 
particular area” (MTSA, 2002).  Whether a TSI follows a natural disaster such as an 
earthquake or tidal wave, or is a much more worrisome event caused by an intelligent 
adversary, we are concerned with how best to continue operating our surviving  
critical infrastructure. 
Current national infrastructure directives do not specify uniform standards for 
measuring domestic seaport cargo-handling capacity, nor decision rules to divert cargo to 
alternate facilities when a primary source or destination facility is rendered unusable or 
degraded.  Additionally, major freight corridors to and from U.S. seaports are key 
supporting infrastructures that influence our maritime cargo-handling capacity, 
congestion, and delays, yet there are little organized data describing these channels.  The 
ultimate purpose of this thesis is two-fold:  First, identify and quantify the disruption and 
incremental costs following a TSI at container ports on the West Coast of the United 
States, and then identify which of these ports contain infrastructure components that are 
potential bottlenecks and/or vulnerable to a TSI that threatens maritime shipping 
capacities, thus indicating they would benefit from incremental investments or 
government subsidies. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
A terrorist attack, or similarly disruptive incident of national significance 
involving the MTS system, can cause a severe ripple effect on other modes of 
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transportation, as well as have adverse economic or national security effects.  The MTS 
consists of those waterways, ports, and intermodal landside connections that allow 
various modes of transportation to move people and goods to, from, and on the water.  
Physically, the MTS is composed of the following: 
• 361 seaports (see Figure 1); 
• 95,000 miles of coastline; the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway; 
• 3,700 marine terminals; 
• 25,000 miles of navigable channels; 
• 238 locks at 192 locations; 
• 3.4 million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zones; 
• 174,000 miles of rail connecting all 48 contiguous states, as well as 
Canada and Mexico; over 45,000 miles of interstate highway, supported 
by over 115,000 miles of other roadways; 
• over 1,400 intermodal connections and thousands of bridges, dams, and 
levees; and, 
• dockworkers, cargo handlers, logisticians, port infrastructure, and the 
complex web of national, regional, and international relationships that 
support the supply-chain economies throughout the world (USCG, 2008). 
 
Figure 1.   The locations of U.S. seaport facilities vital to the Marine Transportation 
System (From:  GAO, 2005). 
The U.S. economy, national defense, and the American standard of living are 
dependent upon the unimpeded viability of the MTS.  Economically, a majority of the 
nation’s commercial maritime activities are concentrated in about a dozen major seaports 
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that annually account for over 90 percent of U.S. imports, valued in excess of $800 
billion, which arrive via containerized cargo vessels (BTS, 2007). 
The Marine Transportation System is an integral part of our nation’s 
economy and even a temporary incapacitation at the local level can have a 
dramatic impact throughout the region and nation (DOT, 1999). 
The MTS is a vital artery to the 440 military installations of the United States, 
enabling ready avenues of supply and mobilization for our armed forces in the event of 
routine and large-scale military deployments.  Additionally, the MTS provides the 
American populace with greater access to domestic and world markets via an affordable 
and reliable means of transportation. 
We develop a means to assess domestic port cargo-handling capacity, identifying 
infrastructure vulnerabilities susceptible to a naturally-occurring or human-caused event 
of significance, and assist in expediting recovery of the MTS in the wake of a TSI.  This 
work provides an analytical tool for commercial and government entities to assess TSI 
impacts to a particular seaport or region (in terms of cost impacts of time delays).  In 
peacetime, we cannot influence private shipping companies’ redirection of assets; 
however, we can advertise the best alternatives in terms of their incremental costs.  Ocean 
carriers are well-advised to follow our lead, because we will anticipate these changes, and 
perhaps influence operation of, or even enhancement of, infrastructure to support these 
ocean carriers.  As it stands, the private shipping industry maintains its own enterprise 
continuity plans based upon proprietary information.  Operational decisions to divert 
cargo to alternate sites, including foreign ports, will be based upon real-time operational 
information about the transportation and intermodal systems. 
In the aftermath of a Transportation Security Incident, the recovery of 
critical infrastructures, resumption of the Marine Transportation System, 
and restoration of communities within the affected area must all occur 
simultaneously and expeditiously (NSMS, 2005). 
We seek to learn how private sector and government agencies can cooperate to 
ensure continuity of operations; in particular, the resumption or redirection of maritime 
commercial activities, including the movement of cargoes to mitigate the larger 
economic, social, and possible national security effects of the incident. 
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C. WHAT WE ARE DOING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
We demonstrate a simulation model of the U.S. West Coast marine container-
handling infrastructure by tracing every container ship from its passage of a U.S.  
Coast Guard-mandated, 96-hour Notice of Arrival (NOA) threshold, to its intended 
destination and subsequent container transfers thereafter.  Utilizing five years of actual 
traffic and container history, and observing operations under normal conditions, we 
model and stress eight West Coast ports with abnormal events ranging from a significant 
reduction in seaport personnel and intermodal operators to wholesale denial of access to 
an entire port, or worse.  Because the U.S. Government cannot tell ocean carriers how to 
operate their vessels following a TSI, we assume they will (or should) respond to 
minimize their costs and schedule disruptions.  Our goal is to induce such ocean-carrier 
behavior and gauge the global costs of each TSI event. 
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II. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
A. MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (MTS) 
The MTS is complex and both geographically and physically diverse in character 
and operation.  It is a critical component of America’s military and economic security, in 
addition to a source of recreational value to the American populace. 
Economically, the MTS is part of the foundation of America’s economic growth 
and prosperity.  The U.S. is the world’s largest and most active trading partner, as over 95 
percent of North American trade (equivalent to 2 billion tons of domestic and 
international freight) enters the country through U.S. seaports annually.  Additionally, the 
MTS supports in excess of 13 million jobs and contributes more than $800 billion 
annually to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) (NSMS, 2005). 
 The MTS faces significant challenges in the near future.  First, it needs to 
accommodate growing levels of consumer demand as international maritime trade is 
expected to more than double by the year 2020, particularly international container 
traffic.  Nowhere will this pressure be felt more than at seaports.  As trade volumes 
increase, the capacity of America’s total intermodal transportation system must increase 
in order to maintain and expand the nation’s economy (MARAD, 2005).  Additionally, 
the security of the MTS will continue to be challenged by both human and naturally-
occurring threats that might disrupt the continuity of operations.  Our nation’s seaports, in 
particular, are inherently vulnerable to a TSI as they are sprawling, reliant on supporting 
complex transportation networks, are easily accessible by water and land, and are 
normally adjacent to crowded metropolitan areas (Martin Associates, 2007). 
The continued health of our economy, our military prowess, and our way of life is 
dependent upon the MTS.  The goal of both industry and government is to protect the 
MTS against a catastrophic event, while ensuring the unimpeded continuity of maritime 
operations subsequent to such an event. 
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B. WEST COAST CONTAINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
The West Coast shipping industry is vital to the health and prosperity of local, 
domestic, and global economies.  It serves as a gateway of international waterborne trade 
between the U.S., the Middle East, Asia, and Pacific Rim countries.  The exports and 
imports through West Coast ports are important elements in America’s manufacturing 
and agricultural bases, and contribute significantly to the American quality of life. 
The West Coast seaport states of Washington, Oregon, and California have 
experienced significant growth in tonnage over the past 30 years, from a reported 60 
million tons in 1970, to 361 million in 2006.  During this period, the composition of 
cargo throughput has changed dramatically with the advent of containerization (Martin 
Associates, 2007).  Containerization is a system of intermodal cargo transport using 
standard International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers that can be 
loaded onto and transported by container ships, trucks, railroad cars, and planes.  This 
research, and modern-day container cargo and shipping, revolves around the twenty-foot 
equivalent container, or TEU.  Table 1 highlights the dimensions and variants of the TEU 
most commonly used today.  Similarly, we consider the Panamax ocean carrier for our 
research.  Panamax container ships are the largest that can navigate through the locks of 
the Panama Canal.  Post-Panamax or “Over-Panamax” ships are larger (see Table 2). 
























(2.6 m) 3,604 cubic feet 2.65
Modern Container Sizes and TEU Capacities
 
Table 1.   Dimensions and variants of the twenty-foot equivalent (TEU), a focus of our 
research.  Two TEUs are equivalent to one (1) forty-foot equivalent, or FEU 
(From:  JANES, 1994). 
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Container Ship 
Class Panamax Class Post-Panamax Class
Length 1,000 ft (305 m)
1,400 ft
 (427 m)
Width 106 ft (32.30 m)
180 ft
 (55.00 m)







65,000 > 65,000 <
 
Table 2.   Dimensional comparison of the Panamax and Post-Panamax container vessels.  
Panamax vessels, a focus of our study, exhibit the largest dimensions capable 
of transiting the Panama Canal (From:  Lloyd’s Register, 2008). 
Per the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), representative of West Coast ocean 
carriers, terminal operators, and stevedoring companies, West Coast ports reported 
handling 8.7 million tons of containerized tonnage in 1970, or only 15 percent of the total 
West Coast tonnage.  By 2006, West Coast containerized cargo grew to 259.9 million 
tons, 72 percent of the total West Coast tonnage (PMA, 2006) and represented  
$443 billion and 39.5 percent of the total U.S. waterborne trade (BOC, 2006). 
 Since 1999, West Coast container handling efforts (imports, exports, and empties) 
efforts have gradually surpassed the combined efforts of both U.S. Gulf and East Coast 
ports.  During this period, the West Coast has annually accounted for more than  
50 percent of the United States’ total waterborne foreign container trade (see Figure 2).  
There are two reasons for this:  First, a booming surge in international trade from Middle 
Eastern and Pacific Rim countries, coupled with increasing U.S. demand, make it more 
advantageous (in terms of cost and distance) for ocean carriers to use trans-Pacific routes 
to move containerized goods to North America, vice the longer Suez Canal-
Mediterranean Sea-Atlantic Ocean transit.  Second, today’s larger container vessels  
(i.e., post-Panamax and greater) are unable to transit the Panama Canal to Gulf and  
East Coast seaports, nor have the majority of East Coast ports maintained the 
infrastructure to accommodate the increasing dimensions of modern container carriers. 
 8
West Coast Percentage of 













Figure 2.   Illustrates the gradual increase in waterborne foreign container trade through 
West Coast seaports from 1999-2006.  In 2006, West Coast seaports 
accounted for more than 52 percent of import containers into the United 
States, while Gulf and East Coast ports accounted for the rest (From:   
BTS, 2007). 
Similarly, container carriers have begun to gradually overtake other means of 
ocean transport.  For example, in 2006, in excess of 6,000 ocean carriers made 89,115 
vessel calls to U.S. seaports.  Twenty-two percent of the total vessel calls were 
accomplished by container vessels (see Figure 3).  Also in 2006, of the 24,086 vessel 
calls made to West Coast seaports, the largest fraction of these calls (29 percent) were 
made by container vessels (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 3.   Percentage of vessel types calling upon U.S. ports in 2006.  Twenty-two 
percent of the 89,115 vessel calls were made by container ships, second only 
to fuel and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tankers (From:  MARAD, 2008a). 


















Figure 4.   Percentage of vessel types calling upon West Coast ports (Washington, 
Oregon, and California) in 2006.  The largest fraction is the twenty-nine 
percent of all vessel calls made by container ships (From:  MARAD, 2008a). 
As worldwide economies continue to develop, the importance of the West Coast 
shipping industry as an economic catalyst will continue to increase.  Growing 
international and trans-Pacific trade not only account for millions of jobs and stimulate 
the economies of the West Coast region, but these ports and the cargo they handle 
support the industrial, retail, and agricultural sectors throughout the United States.  
Providing these key linkages between the American consumer and industrial and 
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agricultural sectors are the West Coast ports located in California, Oregon, and 
Washington, which we now discuss. 
C. WEST COAST SEAPORTS 
Our research models the vessel and cargo throughput of eight West Coast 
seaports, including Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, Oakland, Los Angeles, Long Beach, San 
Diego, and Punta Colonet (Mexico), a proposed Mexican seaport expected to be 
operational by 2012 (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.   The locations of seaports for our research are (North to South) 1. Seattle, 2. 
Tacoma, 3. Portland, 4. Oakland, 5. Los Angeles, 6. Long Beach, 7. San 
Diego and 8. Punta Colonet (Mexico) (After:  Google Earth, 2008). 
We focus on these seaports due to the magnitude of their contribution to the U.S. 
container shipping industry.  For example, in 2006, 18.3 million import containers 
entered the United States as part of international trade.  Of this number, 59 percent, or 
10.8 million TEUs, entered through the West Coast seaports included in our research 
(BTS, 2007) (see Figure 6).  More significantly, of the total handled containers (empty, 
full, domestic, and international) along the West Coast in 2006, 70 percent were handled 
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at the Southern California seaports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, while Pacific 
Northwest seaport traffic was 19 percent and Oakland’s 11 percent accounted for the 
remainder (PMA, 2006). 
2006 U.S. Container Imports




































Figure 6.   The percentages of U.S. import containers transiting the seven U.S.  
West Coast ports of this research.  Combined, these seven West Coast 
seaports accounted for 59 percent of import containers during 2006 (After:   
BTS, 2007). 
1. Seattle, Washington 
The Port of Seattle (POS) is vital to the health of the West Coast shipping 
industry, as it serves as a mainstay of container shipping in the Pacific Northwest and 
Puget Sound region.  In 2006, the Port of Seattle accounted for 8.8 percent of the total 
tonnage throughout all West Coast seaports, 80.3 percent of which was containerized.  
This equates to 1.3 million containers, or TEUs, handled (imports and exports) or 8.5 
percent of the 2006 total West Coast container throughput (PMA, 2006). 
On average, 769 container vessels call upon Seattle in a given year, bearing in 
excess of 600,000 import TEUs (MARAD, 2008a).  Major containerized imports include 
machinery, grain and seed, fish and seafood, and paper products from Asia, South 
America, and Pacific Rim countries with which Seattle has strong trading ties. 
Seattle operates eight marine terminals within three harbors (North, Central, and 
South Harbors) on Puget Sound and Elliot Harbor (see Figure 7).  The South Harbor 
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maintains four container terminals (Terminals 5, 18, 25, and 46) and operates 11 berths, 
25 cranes, and 500 acres of container yard.  The port is host to major ocean carriers 
including American President Lines (APL), Maersk-Sealand, Hapag-Lloyd, and Yang 
Ming Lines.  Intermodal operations are supported by access to nearby interstate highways 
(I-5 and I-90) and on-dock rail facilities serviced by Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
(BNSF) and Union Pacific (UP) rail carriers (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 7.   The location of marine terminals at the Port of Seattle.  The four container 




Figure 8.   The Port of Seattle South Harbor container terminals (Terminals 5, 18, 25, and 
46) are marked by arrows.  Intermodal operations are supported by BNSF and 
UP intermodal yards and access to major highways (After:  POS, 2008). 
2. Tacoma, Washington 
The Port of Tacoma (POT), located on Commencement Bay in southern Puget 
Sound, is a gateway for international trade with Asian countries and serves as a major 
economic hub for the Pacific Northwest region.  More than 70 percent of Tacoma’s 
international container cargo comes from, or is going to, the central and eastern regions 
of North America.  Additionally, Tacoma’s domestic commerce includes the handling of 
more than 70 percent of the marine cargo moving between the lower 48 states and Alaska 
(POT, 2008). 
In 2006, the port accounted for 10.2 percent of the total tonnage throughout West 
Coast seaports, 69.2 percent of which was containerized.  This equates to 1.35 million 
TEUs handled (imports and exports) or 8.9 percent of the total West Coast container 
throughput (PMA, 2006). 
Tacoma is a major hub for bulk, break-bulk, container, automobile, and heavy-lift 
cargoes.  On average, 570 container vessels call at Tacoma in a given year, bearing in 
excess of 643,000 import TEUs laden with major imports such as machinery, clothing, 
textiles, and rubber products. 
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Tacoma maintains six container terminals (Totem Ocean Trailer Express [TOTE], 
Husky, Washington United, Pierce County, Olympic Container, and A.P. Moller-Maersk 
[APM]) (see Figure 9) and operates nine container ship berths, 22 cranes, and 613 acres 
of container yard.  The port is host to major ocean carriers that include Maersk-Sealand, 
Evergreen, and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, or “K” Line.  Intermodal operations are 
supported by four dockside intermodal rail yards serviced by BNSF and UP rail carriers 
and access to nearby major interstate highways (I-5 and I-90) and state roads. 
 
Figure 9.   Locations of container terminals at the Port of Tacoma include 1. TOTE,  
2. Husky, 3. Washington United, 4. Pierce County, 5. Olympic Container, and 
6. APM (After:  Google Earth, 2008). 
3. Portland, Oregon 
The Port of Portland (POP) is a premier Pacific Northwest deep-draft port that 
maintains strong trading ties with China and other Asian partners.  In 2006, Portland was 
responsible for 5.6 percent of total tonnage throughout all West Coast seaports, 14.0 
percent of which was containerized cargo.  This equates to 166,563 TEUs handled 
(imports and exports) or 1.1 percent of West Coast container throughput (PMA, 2006). 
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On average, 139 container vessels call upon Portland in a given year, bearing in excess of 
65,000 import TEUs laden with major imports including electronics, clothing, tires,  
and furniture. 
Portland operates four marine terminals (Terminals 2, 4, 5, and 6) with Terminal 6 
dedicated solely to containers (see Figure 10).  Terminal 6 operates three deepwater 
berths, eight cranes, and 200 acres of container yard (see Figure 11).  The port is host to 
major ocean carriers that include China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO),  
Hapag-Lloyd, Hanjin Shipping, “K” Line, and Yang Ming Lines.  Intermodally, access to 
major north-south and east-west interstates (I-5 and I-84), and near-dock rail facilities 
supported by BNSF and UP rail carriers, ensure containerized cargo moves quickly and 
reliably to inland destinations. 
 
Figure 10.   This figure shows the location of Portland’s container Terminal 6 in 
relation to Terminals 2, 4, and 5 that handle bulk and break-bulk commodities.  
Major rail and highway arteries support Portland’s intermodal operations 
(From:  POP, 2008). 
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Figure 11.   Overhead view of Portland’s Terminal 6 container facility.  The picture 
shows 1. vessel berthing and gantry cranes, 2. the Columbia River,  
3. container yards, and 4. rail facilities (After:  Google Earth, 2008). 
4. Oakland, California 
As the fourth busiest container port in North America (AAPA, 2008), the Port of 
Oakland (POO) is a major international trading hub for bulk, break-bulk, container, 
automobile, and heavy-lift cargoes from Asia, Europe, Australia, and other South Pacific 
Islands.  Oakland loads and discharges more than 99 percent of the containerized goods 
moving through Northern California, the nation’s fourth-largest metropolitan area (POO, 
2008).  In 2006, Oakland accounted for 9.4 percent of total tonnage throughout the West 
Coast seaports, 81.4 percent of which was containerized cargo.  This equates to 1.6 
million TEUs handled (imports and exports) or 10.6 percent of West Coast container 
throughput (PMA, 2006).  On average, 1,926 container vessels call upon Oakland in a 
given year, bearing in excess of 638,000 TEUs laden with major imports including 
beverages, machinery, mineral fuels and oils, construction material, and automobiles. 
The port occupies 19 miles of waterfront on the eastern shore of San Francisco 
Bay, devoting an extensive 900 acres to maritime activities.  Oakland operates 12 
container terminals, 25 deepwater berths, and 35 container cranes.  The port is host to 30 
major ocean carriers that include APL, COSCO, Evergreen, “K” Line, and 
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Maersk-Sealand.  Oakland operates two intermodal container yards supported by BNSF 
and UP rail carriers and has access to major interstates (I-880 and I-980) and state roads 
(see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12.   The Port of Oakland’s container terminals are shaded dark gray and border 
the Oakland Estuary and the San Francisco Bay.  The port is supported by 
access to major interstates (I-880) and state roads (From:  POO, 2008). 
5. Los Angeles, California 
The Port of Los Angeles (POLA) is the largest and busiest container port in North 
America (AAPA, 2008) and is a critical gateway of international commerce to the 
continent.  Major trading partners include China, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and South 
Korea, and international trade from these countries accounted for $184 billion in trade 
revenue in 2007 (POLA, 2008).  In 2006, Los Angeles accounted for 31.3 percent of the 
total import tonnage along the West Coast and 4.5 million import TEUs (PMA, 2006). 
On average, 1,108 container vessels call upon Los Angeles annually, laden with 
furniture, apparel, toys and sporting goods, vehicle and vehicle parts, and electronic 
products.  The 7,500-acre port, located adjacent to the Port of Long Beach (POLB) and 
situated on San Pedro Bay, encompasses 43 miles of waterfront and 27 total cargo 
terminals.  The port operates eight major container terminals (West Basin [2], 
TransPacific, Port of Los Angeles, Yusen, Seaside, APL, and APM; see Figure 13), 30 
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container vessel berths, 68 cranes, and 1,686 acres of container yard.  The port is host to 
80 different major ocean carriers and is intermodally supported by major interstate (I-110 
and I-710) access, four dockside intermodal rail yards, and a near-dock container transfer 
facility located five miles from the port.  The port is a major economic force throughout 
Southern California, the West Coast, and the United States, as the port is responsible for 
1.1 million jobs in the Los Angeles vicinity alone and 3.3 million throughout the country. 
 
Figure 13.   Overhead view of the Port of Los Angeles container terminals that include 
1. West Basin (Berth 100), 2. West Basin (Berths 121-131), 3. TransPacific, 
4.Port of Los Angeles, 5. Yusen, 6. Seaside, 7. APL, and 8. APM (After:  
Google Earth, 2008). 
6. Long Beach, California 
The Port of Long Beach is the second-largest container port in the United States 




North America.  East Asian trade accounts for about 90 percent of the shipments through 
the Port, as top trading partners into Long Beach include China, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Japan. 
In 2006, Long Beach accounted for 26.9 percent of the total West Coast tonnage 
and 30.8 percent or 3.63 million import TEUs (PMA, 2006).  On average, 1,846 container 
vessels call annually to Long Beach carrying major imports including petroleum, 
electronics, plastics, furniture, and clothing. 
The 3,200-acre port operates seven container piers (California United, Hanjin, 
International, Long Beach, Pacific, and two by Stevedoring Services of America [SSA]; 
see Figure 14), 50 container berths, 71 cranes, and 1,284 acres of container yard.  The 
port is host to more than 50 major ocean carriers and is supported intermodally by access 
to major highways and state roads in the Los Angeles-Long Beach area, and on-dock and 
near-dock rail facilities.  Long Beach, like the neighboring Port of Los Angeles (POLA), 
is a major economic force in Southern California; it supports more than 30,000 Long 
Beach jobs, 316,000 jobs throughout Southern California, and 1.4 million jobs 
throughout the United States (POLB, 2008). 
 
Figure 14.   Overhead view of the Port of Long Beach container piers that includes 1. 
California United, 2.Hanjin, 3. International, 4. Long Beach, 5. Pacific, 6a. 
SSA, and 6b. SSA (After:  Google Earth, 2008). 
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7. San Diego, California 
The Port of San Diego (POSD) serves as a transshipment facility for trans-Pacific 
trade to the southwestern United States and Mexico.  In 2006, San Diego accounted for 
1.9 percent of the total tonnage throughout the West Coast, 12.4 percent of which was 
containerized.  This equates to 487,000 TEUs handled (imports and exports) or 0.3 
percent of the total West Coast container throughput (PMA, 2006).  On average, 50 
container vessels call upon San Diego in a given year, bearing in excess of 45,000 TEUs 
laden with major imports such as refrigerated goods, fertilizers, and forest products. 
The port operates three marine terminals with one terminal, the Tenth Avenue 
Marine Terminal, dedicated solely to container shipping (see Figure 15).  The container 
terminal operates eight berths, three cranes, and maintains 25 acres of container yard (see 
Figure 16).  The port maintains a robust on-dock rail facility and is in close proximity to a 
major interstate (I-5) and state roads throughout the southwestern United States and 
Mexico. 
 
Figure 15.   Port of San Diego Terminal locations include 1. Cruise Ship Terminal, 2. 




Figure 16.   The Port of San Diego Tenth Marine Container Terminal includes 1. 
vessel berthing and crane support, 2. container yards, and 3. rail facilities 
(After:  Google Earth, 2008). 
8. Punta Colonet, Mexico 
Mexican authorities are currently soliciting a proposal for the construction of a 
Baja California seaport capable of challenging the West Coast shipping stronghold of 
Southern California seaports.  If built at the proposed location of Punta Colonet, Mexico 
150 miles south of Tijuana, Mexico (see Figure 17), it would serve as a viable option for 
ocean carriers to bypass the congestion of Southern California ports.  Expected to be 
operational by 2012, Punta Colonet is anticipated to be initially capable of handling one-
seventh the current volume of the Port of Los Angeles.  Upon full operational capability, 
the $4 billion port is destined to become one of the largest shipping container facilities on 
the West Coast, capable of handling in excess of 1 million containers per year with 
highway and rail access to the southwestern United States.  For our research,  
Punta Colonet serves a “super port” equipped with sufficient berthing and intermodal 
capabilities to accommodate any diverted vessels subsequent to a TSI at  
West Coast seaports. 
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Figure 17.   The location of the proposed seaport at Punta Colonet, Mexico, 150 miles 
south of Tijuana.  If constructed, the port will challenge the West Coast 
shipping stronghold of Southern California ports (From:  Baja Insider, 2008). 
This is not the first Mexican port to challenge the Southern California shipping 
monopoly.  The Mexican West Coast seaport of Lazaro Cárdenas, a deepwater port that 
handles container, dry bulk, and liquid cargo, currently handles in excess of 180,000 
TEUs per year, with expansion currently underway to handle 2.2 million containers per 
year by 2012.  Through an innovative series of international agreements, infrastructure 
improvements and new technologies, Lazaro Cárdenas has developed efficient trade 
corridors to Kansas City, Chicago, and Houston, enabling Asian-based carriers alternate 
routing to U.S. markets by bypassing Southern California ports (Falche, 2007). 
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III.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. RESEARCH SOFTWARE 
1. Arena 
The Arena simulation modeling system is a flexible and powerful tool that allows 
analysts to create animated simulation models that accurately represent virtually any 
system (Takus and Profozich, 1997).  Arena software is designed to analyze impact 
changes involving significant and complex redesigns associated with supply chain, 
manufacturing, processes, logistics, distribution and warehousing, and service systems 
(Kelton, Sadowski, & Sturrock, 2007).  Arena is applicable to our research because the 
software is designed to identify process bottlenecks, queue build-ups, and the utilization 
of resources as well as analyze and predict system performance metrics to include costs, 
throughput, cycle-time, and utilization of material-handling components.  Arena has been 
credited in resolving system and infrastructure complexities in the field of manufacturing, 
supply chain management, and national defense. 
B. CONTAINER PORT SIMULATION MODEL (CPSM) 
 The following provides the makeup and development of the CPSM, a multistage, 
stochastic simulation model that emulates a portion of the United States’ West Coast 
container shipping industry.  The model can be best described as a network of multiple-
server queuing systems in which the network nodes are represented by the eight West 
Coast container seaports introduced in Chapter II. 
The model is constructed through a series of interconnected flowchart and data 
modules populated with attributes, variables, and expressions.  In presenting the model, 
module names within CPSM are presented in italics, while intrinsic details about the 
Arena model, such as the names and values of attributes, variables, and expressions, are 
embedded in the model files themselves via module descriptions.  The Arena model files 
are available upon request from the author, the advisor, or the second reader. 
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CPSM (see Appendices A thru E) is voluminous, composed of multiple, stacked, 
interconnected modules, with different seaports appearing as modules exact in 
appearance and function, differing only in name.  For exposition, modules representing 
the Port of Seattle are presented. 
 CPSM is a four-stage simulation model that includes the following components: 
1. Container Port Simulation Model (CPSM) Stages 
a. Ship Entity Creation Stage 
In the first stage of CPSM, a container ship entity is created and assigned 









Figure 18.   The CPSM Ship Entity Creation Stage consists of 1. a Create Module that 
creates a ship entity, 2. an Assign Module that assigns the ship a port-of-call 
and animation properties, and 3. a Station Module that identifies the physical 
or logical location of the ship at a given time. 
The model starting point is a Create Module (Seattle Bound Ship Arrives 
to NOA) that creates a ship and affixes a creation, or interarrival time, to each entity.  Per 
Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) all vessels bound for U.S. seaports are 
required to submit a NOA positional transmission to the National Vessel Movement 
Center (NVMC), indicating the vessel’s intentions, at least 96 hours prior to entry into 
port (NVMC, 2007).  An assumption of our modeling and routing logic is that each 
interarrival time represents a ship’s approach to an imaginary NOA line where each ship 
transmits a positional transmission to the NVMC.  In return, the NVMC provides West 
Coast seaport status, and if a ship’s destination is incapacitated, the NVMC provides the 
ship with alternative routing options. 
The development of interarrival times stems from statistical manipulation 
of five years of Maritime Administration ship arrival data (MARAD, 2008a).  The mean 
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interarrival time ( pλ ) of a container vessel to the NOA, bound for one of eight  
West Coast seaports, is calculated per the following formulation with individual port 
values presented in Table 3: 
Given Data [cardinality or units] 
d   Days in one calendar year [365] 
i   Year number 
n   Years of container ship observations [5] 
C    Container ship port calls [arrivals; total calls] 
p    Observed port [7] 
h   Hours in one day [24] 
Statistics [units] 








= ∑  Container ship mean port calls [calls/year] 
Arrival Rate 
/p ph Yλ =   Container ship mean interarrival time to NOA line [hours] 
(1) Seattle, WA 769 2.11 11.40
(2) Tacoma, WA 570 1.56 15.38
(3) Portland, OR 139 0.38 63.11
(4) Oakland, CA 1,926 5.28 4.55
(5) Los Angeles, CA 1,108 3.03 7.91
(6) Long Beach, CA 1,846 5.06 4.75











( )pX ( )pY ( )pλ
 
Table 3.   Mean port calls, daily arrival rates, and interarrival times for container vessels 
bound for West Coast seaports of our research.  A Seattle bound vessel arrives 
to the NOA, on average, every 11.40 hours (MARAD, 2008a). 
Within CPSM, pλ  values are used as means of exponential distributions, 
which are applicable to this type of research.  The exponential distribution is frequently 
 26
used as a model for the distribution of times between the occurrence of successive events, 
such as customers arriving at a service facility or calls coming in to a switchboard 
(Devore, 2004). 
The ensuing Assign Module (Assign Seattle Ship Attributes) assigns 
multiple attributes and animation pictures to entities.  Here, each ship is assigned a port-
of-call and a graphic representation (ship picture) for use in model animation.  The 
stage’s final module, a Station Module (Seattle Station Node) defines the physical or 
logical location of the ship.  Here, that location is represented by a 96-hour western 
alignment with a port-of-call (see Figure 19).  The above logic is repeated independently 
for each port, with appropriate adjustments made for parameter values and other 
attributes, as described in Table 3. 
 
Figure 19.   CPSM animation snapshot within Arena.  Here, ships bound for 1. Seattle, 
2. Tacoma, 3. Oakland, 4. Los Angeles, and 5. Long Beach transit the 96-hour 
NOA line and approach a port-of-call.  The average separation between each 
vessel is indicative of each port’s random ship interarrival time; a lower value 
(higher arrival rate) narrows the gap between ships. 
b. Port Routing Logic Stage 
The second stage of CPSM details our seaport routing logic in case a ship 
needs to choose an alternate destination subsequent to a TSI.  This stage is presented by 
three substages (see Figure 20). 
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Figure 20.   Three substages of the Port Routing Logic Stage within CPSM are each 
shown in a dashed box.  Substage A checks the operational status of seaports, 
Substage B provides routing logic for diverted vessels and Substage C aligns 
each ship with an assigned port. 
1) Port Routing Logic Substage A.  An Assign Module 
(Assign Ship Characteristics) initiates the stage and assigns each ship entity an arrival 
time to system, draft, and container load.  This arrival time is the simulation time at 
which the ship begins transiting the model.  The draft attribute assigned to each entity is 
consistent with that of the Panamax class container ship identified in Chapter II (41 feet).  
Ship draft is critical in our port-routing logic; if a ship entity is forced to divert, a vessel’s 
draft must be substantially less than the destination seaport channel draft.  Each ship’s 
container load, ctnλ , is developed through the manipulation of five years of container 
throughput data (MARAD, 2008b) at our eight ports of research per the following 
formulation.  Individual port values are presented in Table 4. 
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Statistics [units] 
ctnT    Port mean import containers handled [containers/year] 
pX    Container vessel mean port calls [calls/year] 
Container Content 
/ctn ctn pT Xλ =  Mean container load [containers/vessel] 
(1)  Seattle, WA 769 668,594 870
(2)  Tacoma, WA 570 643,447 1,130
(3)  Portland, OR 139 65,013 468
(4)  Oakland, CA 1,926 638,463 331
(5)  Los Angeles, CA 1,108 3,783,317 3,416
(6)  Long Beach, CA 1,846 2,978,756 1,614
















Table 4.   Mean annual ship port calls, import containers handled, and mean container 
loads for vessels bound for West Coast ports.  Ships bound for Seattle, on 
average, carry 870 TEUs (MARAD, 2008b). 
We generate each container load value (λctn) from a triangular 
distribution because such distributions are common when minimum, maximum, and 
modal (most likely) values may be reasonably specified, and when we lack detailed 
observed data to which distributions could otherwise be fit (Ross, 1998). 
The Decide Module, Destination Port Open?, senses whether the 
destination port is open.  An operational seaport (“true”) indication enables the ship entity 
to proceed to the Assign Module (Actual Port Is Destination Port), which directs each 
ship to an originally-intended destination, while a “false” indication diverts the ship into 
the port routing logic (Substage B). 
The following section presents Substage B of CPSM’s Port 
Routing Logic Stage that checks the operational status of adjacent ports, channel draft, 
 29
queue length, port-to-port distances, and service times in choosing the optimal port for a 
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Figure 21.   CPSM Port Routing Logic Substage B consisting of various Assign and 
Decision Modules. 
2) Port Routing Logic Substage B.  Substage B represents the 
operational decision of a ship operator subsequent to a TSI and the congestion or 
incapacitation of a port.  Here, modeling logic checks the operational status, channel 
draft, queue length, proximity, and service time of adjacent West Coast ports in choosing 
an optimal port for a diverted ship.  Diverted vessels respond to a combination of distance 
and existing port congestion, both of which translate into greater time delays and, thus, 
greater costs.  These additional operating costs for Panamax class carriers are discussed 
in CPSM’s ensuing stage, the Terminal Processing Stage.  Note that each ship entity 
comes through this same logic, regardless of bound port, as it is general enough not to 
require separate copies for each bound port. 
3) Port Routing Logic Substage C.  In this substage, the 
Decide Module, Route to Actual Destination, aligns each ship with its original destination 
or a seaport assigned by model routing logic.  The Dispose Module is intended as the 
ending point for entities in a simulation model; however, here this module is an error trap 







Figure 22.   CPSM Port Routing Logic Substage C consisting of a Decide Module that 
directs each ship to its originally intended or logic-assigned port-of-call.  The 
Dispose Module serves as a relief valve for faulty model logic. 
c. Terminal Processing Stage 
The third main stage of CPSM, the Terminal Processing Stage, represents 
the ship berthing and container yard operations of our model.  This stage is presented in 
three substages. 
1) Terminal Processing Substage A 
 
Figure 23.   CPSM Terminal Processing Substage A that simulates ship berthing and 
container offloading.  The incremental operating costs and load values of each 
ship are recorded in this substage. 
Here, a ship first traverses a Route Module (Route to Seattle 
Station), which calculates the route time to a port-of-call.  For nondiverted ships we 
assume the ship’s position at the NOA to be due west of the original intended port.  This 
route time is simply 96 hours; on the other hand, a diverted ship’s route time is computed 
via basic planar geometry. 
A Station Module (Seattle Port Station) follows that defines each 
ship’s logical position within the model.  Here, the ship is entering port and the Seize 
Module (Seize Seattle Berth) allocates a berth to the ship.  If no berth is available, the 
ship joins a queue.  The ensuing Record Module (Record Seattle Ship Demurrage) is 
used to collect each ship’s total incremental operating costs of steaming and anchorage 
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times, or demurrage.  In commercial shipping, ship demurrage is the time cost of 
ownership, and an ancillary cost that represents here liquidated damages for delays in 
shipments, in particular when a vessel is prevented from loading or discharging cargo 
within a contracted time.  Here, we model ship demurrage as the daily operating costs of 
a 20-year old, 35,000 DWT Panamax vessel as $50,000 while underway and $32,000 at 
anchorage, respectively.  These figures depict a break-even, voyage-time charter rate and 
do not include profit, fuel costs, and insurance, and is independent of the container cargo 
value the vessel carries (Mashagbeh, 2008).  Similarly, in the ensuing stages, we model 
the effects of container demurrage, or those costs incurred to a carrier when a cargo 
container sits frustrated at a destination port beyond the port allowed free demurrage time 
(a given number of days) as stipulated in individual port tariff documents. 
The subsequent Record Module (Record Container Load) records 
the aggregate container load values for all ships and the final module of this substage, a 
Delay Module (Unload at Port Berth), functions as the service time ( sλ ) for a container 
ship at berth.  Modeling crane productivity depends upon a number of factors including 
the number and type of cranes servicing a ship, the capabilities of the operator(s), 
stowage patterns, and the location of the crane within the layout of the terminal  
(i.e., pierside or onboard).  Data collection at the Port of Oakland’s Ben E. Nutter 
Terminal enable us to model a single container crane lifting capability (27-30 TEU lifts 
per hour) as having a Uniform Distribution between 1/30 and 1/27, or Uniform  
(a = 1/30,b = 1/27).  For such a Uniform Distribution, the expected container lifts per 
hour,µ  is computed as 1 / 3 0 1 / 2 7
2 2
a bµ + += =  and the standard deviation of 
the number of lifts per hour, σ , is 2 2( ) (1 / 30 1 / 27)
12 12
b aσ − −= = (Devore, 2004).  
Applying the Central Limit Theorem, which is appropriate because the number of 
containers on a ship is typically in the thousands, the total amount of time to offload a 
container vessel has approximately a Normal Distribution with a mean (container 
load*µ ) and a standard deviation ( container load *σ ).  Port service times applied 
within CPSM are identified in Table 5. 
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(1) Seattle, WA 870 30.61, 0.93
(2) Tacoma, WA 1,130 39.76, 1.21
(3) Portland, OR 468 16.47, 0.50
(4) Oakland, CA 331 11.65, 0.35
(5) Los Angeles, CA 3,416 120.19, 3.65
(6) Long Beach, CA 1,614 56.79, 1.73










Table 5.   Port service times for container vessels.  The service times are expressed as 
the mean and standard deviation of a Normal Distribution (µ , σ ).  On 
average, a Seattle ship will be serviced in 30.61 hours, with a standard 
deviation of 0.93 hours. 
The following section presents Substage B of CPSM’s Terminal 
Processing Stage (see Figure 24).  This substage simulates the movement of containers 
from pier to terminal container yard. 
 
Figure 24.   CPSM Terminal Processing Substage B consisting of various modules 
(i.e., Route, Assign, Seize, Release, and Delay) used to simulate the transfer 
of container cargo to container yards. 
2) Terminal Processing Substage B.  In this substage, a ship 
initially encounters a Route Module (Route to Seattle Area) that simulates the container 
load routing from pierside to a staging area within the terminal container yard by 




Figure 25.   This picture shows a “top picker” releasing a container onto a yard truck 
or “hustler” at the Port of Oakland in March 2008. 
 
Figure 26.   This picture shows a yard truck or “hustler” used to transport containers 
throughout container and intermodal yards at the Port of Oakland in  
March 2008. 
The Station Module (Seattle Staging Area Station Name) defines a container load’s 
position within a container yard, while the ensuing Assign Module (Assign Arrival Time 
to Seattle Staging Area) marks the load’s arrival time to the container yard and is used 
downstream in the logic to determine container demurrage.  The Assign Module also 
modifies the entity’s avatar (for simulation animation) from a ship to a container. 
The Seize Module (Seize Seattle Staging Area) allocates a 
resource, here a partition of the existing capacity of the seaport terminal container yard.  
Pinpointing an actual “box in the yard” capacity for the eight ports and 36 terminals 
proved problematic because the terminal operators are not sure of this capacity.  In 




imagery because port regulations and safety issues govern “how many high” containers 
may be stacked.  Figure 27 illustrates containers stacked “four high” at the Port of 
Oakland. 
 
Figure 27.   This picture shows containers stacked “four high” with a “hustler” in the 
foreground at the Port of Oakland in March 2008. 
The stevedoring company for the Port of Oakland’s Hanjin 
Terminal, Total Terminals Inc., provided a 14,000-TEU capacity approximation for their 
120-acre facility (D’Silva, 2008).  Using a simple linear equation pairing Hanjin values 
against the remaining 35 terminals of this study, an approximate TEU capacity has been 
developed through the following formulation with accompanying seaport capacity 
approximations listed in Table 6. 
Given Data [units] 
a  Terminal 1 container capacity [TEUs] 
b  Terminal 1 container yard area [acres] 
c  Terminal 2 container capacity [TEUs] 














(1) Seattle 4 501 58,450
(2) Tacoma 6 536 62,533
(3) Portland 1 200 23,333
(4) Oakland 9 759 88,585
(5) Los Angeles 8 1,686 196,700
(6) Long Beach 7 1,284 149,800
(7) San Diego 1 25 2,917
(8) Punta Colonet 1 2,970 346,500
Table 6.   Estimated container capacities of seaports included in this study.  The 
estimated cumulative container capacity of Seattle’s four container terminals 
(Terminals 5, 18, 25, and 46) is 58,450 TEUs. 
The Release Module (Release Seattle Berth) represents the 
completion of a ship’s service time and subsequently releases a ship from the assigned 
berth.  The final module of the substage, a Delay Module, delays cargo by an amount of 
time representative of the delay before it is moved out of the container yard by truck. 
The following section presents Substage C of CPSM’s Terminal 
Processing Stage which simulates the movement of containers to trucks (see Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28.   CPSM Terminal Processing Stage Substage C consisting of Release, 
Seize, Assign, and Record Modules.  This stage simulates the transfer of 
containers from terminal container yard to truck.  Incremental container 
demurrage fees are calculated in this substage. 
3) Terminal Processing Sub-Stage C.  The Release Module 
(Release Seattle Staging Area) initiates this substage and simulates the release of a 
container load to a truck.  This is a broad assumption area of our modeling because 
normal terminal operations will release only individual containers to consignees.  
Additionally, we model the trucking of containers from seaports and exclude rail 
transport.  The ensuing Assign Module, Seattle Load Hours in Yard, calculates the total 
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time a container load sits frustrated in a container yard and the final module of the 
substage is a Record Module (Record Seattle Staging Area Demurrage) that calculates 
container yard demurrage costs to ship owners and their cargo based upon individual 
seaport port tariff documents.  We model a “door-to-door” contract in which the ocean 
carrier is responsible for all cargo movement and associated fees related to the transport 
(and possible delays) of shipment to the consignee.  We assume “force majeure” does not 
exist and port Executive Directors will not extend the allowable free demurrage time that 
cargo may occupy terminal space.  By these assumptions, our goal is to identify the 
incremental costs suffered by ocean carriers from frustrated cargo subsequent to a TSI. 
d. Landside Routing Logic Stage 
The final stage of CPSM emulates cargo routing from port terminals to 
metropolitan areas throughout the United States.  This stage is presented in three 






Figure 29.   Three CPSM Landside Routing Logic Substages, each denoted with a 
dashed box.  Substage A proportionally allocates each container load to U.S. 
metropolitan areas based upon population density, Substage B checks truck 
routing to each zip code, and Substage C routes each container load to a final 
destination and records the total time in port. 
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1) Landside Routing Logic Substage A.  In this substage, 
container loads are proportionally allocated to one-digit zip codes throughout the United 
States based upon population densities.  For states comprising each one-digit zip code 
(see Figure 30), estimated populations were compiled and ranked in accordance with 
Table 7. 
 
Figure 30.   Zip code regions of the United States.  Population densities for each one-
digit region are used to proportionally allocate West Coast container loads.  
New England states comprise Zip Code 0 (From:  USCB, 2008). 
1 9 48,735,960 15.95
2 3 41,499,348 13.58
3 7 34,649,697 11.34
4 1 32,595,285 10.67
5 4 32,125,502 10.51
6 2 29,199,503 9.56
7 0 26,891,564 8.80
8 6 23,281,531 7.62
9 8 20,403,129 6.68













Table 7.   United States one-digit zip code population rankings.  States comprising  
Zip Code 9 maintain the largest population density and are allocated the 
greatest proportion of each container load within the CPSM.  For example, 
15.95 percent of a 4,000-TEU container load, or 638 containers, would be 
routed to Zip Code 9 (After:  Demographia, 2008). 
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The following section presents Substage B of CPSM’s Landside 
Routing Logic Stage that proportionally allocates each container load to landside 








Type to Pile of
Change Entity
 
Figure 31.   CPSM Landside Routing Logic Substage B consisting of a Decide Module 
and two Assign Modules.  This substage ensures each container load is 
proportioned to each one-digit zip code and changes the avatar of the entity 
from that of a container to a truck. 
2) Landside Routing Logic Sub-Stage B.  The Decide (Last 
Zip?) and Assign Module (Adjust Size of Container Pile to Be Exact) checks to ensure 
each container load has been proportionally divided to the ten different zip codes of the 
United States.  The remaining Assign Module (Change Entity Type to Pile of Containers) 
modifies the entity’s avatar (for simulation animation) from a container into a truck. 
The following section presents Substage C of CPSM’s Landside 






Record Total Load is Home
 
Figure 32.   CPSM Landside Routing Stage Substage C consisting of Route, Station, 
Record, and Dispose Modules.  This substage routes each truck to a final 
destination and records the container’s total time in port. 
3) Landside Routing Logic Sub-Stage C.  In this final 
substage of CPSM, the module Route to Proper Zip routes each truck entity to a 
metropolitan area (Zip 1 Station Module) of the United States (see Figure 33). 
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Figure 33.   Snapshot of the landside animation within CPSM.  Here, as 1. ships arrive 
into Seattle, 2. containers are offloaded and accumulate in the port’s container 
yard.  Containers are then 3. trucked to metropolitan areas throughout the 
United States. 
The final two modules of CPSM include a Record Module (Record 
Total Time in System) and a Dispose Module (Load is Home).  The Record Module 
records each passing entity’s total time in port and the Dispose Module, Load is Home, 
functions as the ending point for the simulation entities. 
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IV. SCENARIO, ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. SCENARIOS FOR RESEARCH 
A maritime infrastructure risk assessment scale developed by ABS Consulting of 
Knoxville, Tennessee, aids our scenario development (Hanson, 2008).  The Maritime 
Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) is a derivation of various Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) maritime security directives 
and categorizes the potential impact of a TSI upon port operations, the civilian populace, 
and local and national economies (see Figure 34).  We use this scale to determine the 
time interval each of our hypothesized TSI events affects the MTS. 
 
Figure 34.   The Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) provides a 
scale to estimate the time interval a TSI affects the MTS.  For instance, a 
Category 2 incident can potentially disrupt a port’s operations from 4 to 7 
days and affect up to 25 percent of the port’s commerce (From:   
Hanson, 2008). 
1. Baseline Model – Normal Operations 
We first model “normal operations” of the West Coast shipping industry to 
establish baseline statistics to which we may compare abnormal scenarios.  The baseline 
run represents the eight seaports introduced in Chapter II and their associated intermodal 
assets (i.e., berthing, container yard space, and trucking).  From time-series plots of key 
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output variables, we decided one month is an appropriate warm-up period for our model, 
so we base all our observations on the following 11 months of operations. 
2. Isolated Incident:  Ports of Los Angeles (POLA) and Long Beach 
(POLB) 
We model an isolated incident affecting the neighboring Ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach.  The remaining West Coast seaports remain fully operational.  The incident, 
a security breach, earthquake, or any other naturally-occurring or human-caused event of 
significance, incapacitates both seaports (berths, container yards, and trucking) for a 
period of two weeks, bringing port operations to a standstill.  After one-month’s time 
from the onset of the incident, both ports gradually recover to full operational capability 
(i.e., 100 percent of berths, container yards, and intermodal operations are functionally 
restored).  Per the MSRAM, this incident is modeled as CAT 4. 
3. Oakland Earthquake 
We simulate a 7.2 earthquake in the vicinity of the Port of Oakland.  Centered 
near Interstate-880 (I-880) and the Nimitz Freeway, the incident incapacitates the seaport 
for two weeks, then full operational capability is gradually recovered after one-month’s 
time from the onset of the earthquake (i.e., 100 percent of berths, container yards, and 
intermodal operations are functionally restored).  The remaining West Coast seaports 
remain fully operational.  Per the MSRAM, we categorize the Oakland earthquake as 
CAT 4. 
4. Reduced Resource:  Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
(TWIC) 
The TWIC is a common identification card initiative for all personnel allowed 
unescorted access to secure areas of marine facilities and vessels (TSA, 2008).  
Promulgated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and administered by 
USCG and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), an estimated one million 
national seaport workers, including merchant mariners, port facility employees, 
longshoremen, and truck drivers, will be required to carry this “Smart Card.”  We model 
a single West Coast compliance date.  The inability of a significant amount of personnel 
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to obtain the TWIC (Aitoro, 2008), coupled with stringent compliance date marshalling, 
results in a 25 percent resource (i.e., manpower, ship berthing, container handling, and 
trucking) reduction at all West Coast ports for two weeks.  After the two-week period, 
100 percent of West Coast seaport personnel possess the required identification (or the 
requirement is further delayed).  Per the MSRAM, this incident is modeled as CAT 3. 
5. International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) 
Lockout 
 In September 2002, the PMA, representative of 72 ocean cargo carriers, terminal 
operators, and stevedoring companies of the West Coast shipping industry, locked 
longshoremen, dockworkers, and marine clerks out of terminals and their jobs in 
retaliation for an intentional slowdown of labor by the ILWU (see Figure 35).  The 
slowdown resulted from contentions about safety, workforce size, and job security issues 
that were being exacerbated by increasing automation of terminal cargo-handling 
operations.  The lockout closed West Coast seaports from San Diego to the Canadian 
border, which handle more than 77 percent of the nation’s inbound container cargo from 
Asia, for 10 days, costing the U.S. economy billions in revenue (White, 2008).  The 
lockout ended when President George W. Bush enacted the Taft-Hartley Act that restricts 
the activities and power of labor unions in cases of national importance. 
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Figure 35.   International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) 
picketers at the Oakland docks, October 2002.  The ILWU lockout lasted 10 
days and cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars in revenue (From:  
Internationalist, 2002). 
We model this scenario twice.  First, the scenario “ILWU-“ is run.  The “-“ represents the 
case where West Coast-bound ships cannot call upon the Mexican port of Punta Colonet.  
The second run, “ILWU+,” identifies Punta Colonet as an alternate port for West Coast-
bound ocean carriers during the lockout.  After the 10-day lockout, all West Coast ports 
return to full functionality (i.e., 100 percent of berths, container yards, and intermodal 
operations are operationally restored).  Per the MSRAM, these scenarios are modeled as 
CAT 3 incidents. 
B. RESULTS 
Our analysis provides key insights on resource utilization, vessel waiting time, 
and queue lengths, vessel and container throughput, as well as incremental costs inflicted 
on ocean carriers subsequent to a TSI.  Because our models involve random inputs  
(i.e., arrival times and service times), the outputs are also random, so it is incumbent upon 
us to gather statistics on output variability.  In pilot runs, we found that making 1,000 
independent one-year replications of each scenario, each initialized, warmed-up and 
stopped in the same way, provides very good precision because of the very small 
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confidence intervals achieved for our statistics.  In the tables we present, we report the 
mean over the 1,000 replications for each output performance statistic, as well as the half-
width of 95 percent confidence intervals on the expected values of these outputs; both of 
these measures are automatically computed by the Arena simulation software. 
1. Baseline Model – Normal Operations 
a. West Coast Effects 
Under normal conditions, in which ships bound for West Coast ports dock 
at originally-intended destinations, seaport berths and container yards exhibit relatively 
low utilization indicative of sufficient capacity.  For our simulation, Los Angeles exhibits 
the highest berth utilization value of 0.53 (e.g., at any instant in time, a berth is occupied 
with this probability).  The closer a utilization value gets to 1.0, the more congested the 






































Figure 36.   West Coast seaports berth utilization values under normal conditions.  The 
Port of Los Angeles exhibits the highest (0.53). 
containers, while in 2006, the movement of export and empty containers accounted for 
48.7 percent of container movement along the West Coast (PMA, 2006).  We know that 
some capacity in our model is consumed by loading export and empty containers; 
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nonetheless, our models and our observations are all under the same assumptions, so 
comparisons of TSI-afflicted scenarios with this baseline scenario remain valid within 
these assumptions. 
These low-berth and container-yard utilization values induce negligible 
average waiting times for vessels attempting to berth coastwide (see Table 8).  However, 
even under normal conditions, the West Coast infrastructure is susceptible to sporadic 
congestion caused by the random arrivals and service times of ships.  For example, we 
observe that a Los Angeles-bound ship will wait 71.48 hours (3 days) for a berth and 
harbor congestion in San Pedro Bay, at a given time, can produce a 13-ship backlog at 
Los Angeles (see Table 8 and Figure 37).  Harbor congestion is also evident at ports with 
less seaport infrastructure and traffic intensity such as the Pacific Northwest ports of 
Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland.  This congestion induces minimal incremental operating 
costs to ocean carriers when we take into consideration the total West Coast ship 
throughput.  For an 11-month simulation, 5,858 West Coast-bound ships accrue a 
coastwide total of $29,000 in additional operating costs.  This equates to less than  














For: Average Average Average Average Average Min Max Average Max Average Max
Long Beach          (Berth) 1,688 ± 3 - 2,725,347 ± 4,101 0.25 ± 0.00 0.22 0.28 - - - -
(CY) - - 119,806 ± 421 - 0.14 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 - - - -
Los Angeles         (Berth) 1,012 ± 2 13.68 ± 5.20 3,457,808 ± 6,955 0.53 ± 0.00 0.46 0.60 0.01 ± 0.00 71.48 - 13
(CY) - - 151,616 ± 692 - 0.13 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 - - - -
Oakland               (Berth) 1,761 ±  3 - - 583,017 ±  901 0.11 ± 0.00 0.10 0.12 - - - -
(CY) - - - - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.07 - - - -
Portland                (Berth) 127.27 ±  0.69 3.66 ± 0.55 - 59,504 ± 331 0.09 ± 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.02 ± 0.00 26.72 - 3
(CY) - - 140.93 ± 2.26 - 0.03 ± 0.00 0.02 0.04 - - - -
Punta Colonet      (Berth) - - - - - - - - - - -
(CY) - - - - - - - - - - -
San Diego             (Berth) 45.02 ±  0.42 - - 40,689 ±  381 0.02 ± 0.00 0.01 0.04 - - - -
(CY) - - 568.97 ± 15.40 - 0.17 ± 0.00 0.07 0.28 1.64 ± 0.13 197.85 - 4
Seattle                  (Berth) 702.95 ±  1.62 0.97 ± 0.52 - 611,886 ± 1,437 0.26 ± 0.00 0.22 0.30 - 26.59 - 6
(CY) - 28,059 ± 165 - 0.09 ± 0.00 0.08 0.11 - - - -
Tacoma                  (Berth) 521.00 ±  1.38 10.71 ± 1.59 588,528 ±  1,605 0.30 ± 0.00 0.24 0.36 0.02 ± 0.00 40.71 - 6
(CY) - - 9,153 ± 62 - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.09 - - - -
Total West Coast  (Berth) 5,858 29.03 ± 5.48 - 8,066,782 ± 8,280 - - - - - - -
(CY) - - 309,346 ± 823 - - - - - - - -







Table 8.   Data output from CPSM Normal Operations scenario.  From 1,000 simulations, on average, the Port of Los Angeles 
received 1,012 container vessels and in excess of 3.4 million imported TEUs.  The incremental operating costs incurred by 
Los Angeles-bound ships are minimal when compared to ship throughput.  Despite 0.53 berth utilization, at a given point, a 
ship bound for Los Angeles is expected to wait 71.48 hours and the port will experience a 13-ship backlog. 
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Figure 37.   Snapshot from CPSM during normal operations.  Sporadic West Coast 
congestion of 1. ships and 2. containers are shown at Oakland, Los Angeles, 
and Long Beach.  Containers are offloaded and transported from container 
yards via 3. trucks.  A backlog of ships is visible at 4. Los Angeles. 
 Conversely, low utilization values do not always reflect minimal waiting 
time and queue lengths.  San Diego, although maintaining the smallest container yard and 
container yard capacity on the West Coast, exhibits the longest average ship-to-container 
yard transfer (1.64 hours) with a maximum transfer time of 197.85 hours (8 days)  
(see Table 8).  Recall San Diego’s mean interarrival time ( pλ ) of 175.20 hours and 
service time ( sλ ) of 31.84 hours of ships.  It appears the port’s ability to accommodate 
additional vessels and cargo is unrealistic, and the harbor is highly susceptible to over-
congestion and a bottleneck if tasked to accommodate additional volume subsequent to a  
West Coast TSI. 
 Ship and container throughput values for the entire West Coast align with 
annual values in Chapter III and indicate the consistency of our model.  Because of 
sporadic congestion and wait times, the entire West Coast shipping industry accrues  
$309 million in container demurrage fees.  In relation to the 8.06 million TEUs transiting 
the West Coast, this demurrage value equates to roughly $38 per container.  A port-by-
port analysis of container throughput indicates ocean carriers are susceptible to suffer at 
 49
least one-day container demurrage for frustrated cargo at any West Coast seaport  
(see Table 9).  For example, a port does not assess cargo demurrage fees until a container 
sits frustrated beyond the port’s demurrage free time period, which is normally five days.  
On the sixth day, a carrier is assessed cargo demurrage fees for the first five days plus an 
even greater rate for the additional days thereof. 
(1) Seattle, WA $46.00 $45.85
(2) Tacoma, WA $17.00 $15.55
(3) Portland, OR $2.50 $2.36
(4) Oakland, CA $34.00 -
(5) Los Angeles, CA $43.00 $43.84
(6) Long Beach, CA $43.00 $43.95
(7) San Diego, CA $12.60 $13.98









Table 9.   The first column shows the published container demurrage fees per current 
port tariff documents.  If a container is unloaded and removed from port 
stowage within five days, there is no demurrage penalty.  However, if the 
container is frustrated (delayed) six, or more days, the port demurrage fee is 
charged for the total number of days in storage.  For example, a container can 
spend five days in Seattle for free, but if it stays six days, a demurrage charge 
of $276.00 is due.  The second column shows the average demurrage cost 
incurred per TEU by ocean carriers bound for West Coast ports.  We therefore 
infer, because of random congestion, that ocean carriers bound for Seattle are 
likely to pay a single day of container demurrage fees per container.  Oakland 
bound carriers experience negligible congestion and do not incur any 
additional cargo fees. 
2. Isolated Incident:  Ports of Los Angeles (POLA) and Long Beach 
(POLB) 
a. Affected Ports 
Analysis shows incapacitating the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 
for two weeks will induce significant ship and cargo congestion within San Pedro Bay.  
We observe that the average delay for ship berthing, at both ports, exceeds 3.60 hours, 
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with a maximum waiting time surpassing 336 hours (14 days) (see Table 10).  Substantial 
ship and cargo queuing is observed at anchorages and docks—up to 36 ships and 25 
(1,614 TEUs) container loads at Long Beach and 23 ships and 28 (3,416 TEUs) container 
loads at Los Angeles are simulated to await disposition.  This congestion reduces ship 
and container throughput at both ports from vessel diverts; Long Beach’s annual volume  
dips by 72 vessels (4.26 percent) and 115,971 TEUs (4.46 percent), while throughput at 
Los Angeles is degraded by 41 vessels (3.97 percent) and 136,928 TEUs (4.14 percent) in 















For: Average Average Average Average Average Min Max Average Max Average Max
Long Beach          (Berth) 1,616 ± 3 7,769 ± 111 - 2,608,880 ± 4,125 0.26 ± 0.00 0.24 0.30 3.61 ± 0.05 336.00 0.73 ± 0.01 36
(CY) - - 157,836 ± 711 - 0.14 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 2.09 ± 0.04 335.99 0.42 ± 0.01 25
Los Angeles         (Berth) 971.91 ± 1.98 4,672 ± 86 - 3,320,494 ± 6,889 0.56 ± 0.00 0.49 0.62 3.60 ± 0.07 373.25 0.44 ± 0.01 23
(CY) - - 219,247 ± 1,238 - 0.13 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 3.54 ± 0.06 335.99 0.43 ± 0.01 28
Oakland               (Berth) 1,761 ±  3 - - 583,147 ± 884 0.11 ± 0.00 0.09 0.12 - - - -
(CY) - - - - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.08 - - - -
Portland                (Berth) 127.33 ±  0.69 3.41 ± 0.57 - 59,481 ± 323 0.09 ± 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.02 ± 0.00 28.40 - 3
(CY) - - 140.83 ± 2.20 - 0.03 ± 0.00 0.02 0.04 - - - -
Punta Colonet      (Berth) - - - - - - - - - - -
(CY) - - - - - - - - - - -
San Diego             (Berth) 25.16 ± 0.25 5.33 ± 1.90 - 42,944 ±  300 0.63 ± 0.00 0.62 0.65 0.93 ± 0.22 514.91 29.65 ± 0.27 92
(CY) - - 289.16 ± 18.88 - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.02 0.16 3.00 ± 0.35 481.09 4.87 ± 0.00 8
Seattle                  (Berth) 773.33 ± 1.69 6,318 ± 179 - 725,860 ± 1,649 0.30 ± 0.00 0.26 0.35 8.99 ± 0.34 346.11 0.87 ± 0.03 75
(CY) - - 33,432 ± 195 - 0.11 ± 0.00 0.10 0.13 - - - -
Tacoma                  (Berth) 521.64 ±  1.36 12.01 ± 1.85 - 589,503 ±  1,582 0.30 ± 0.00 0.25 0.36 0.02 ± 0.00 47.88 - 8
(CY) - - 9,169 ± 59 - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.08 - - - -
Total West Coast  (Berth) 5,797 18,780 ± 229 - 7,930,311 ± 8,283 - - - - - - -
(CY) - - 420,113 ± 1,414 - - - - - - - -
Note: CY stands for container yard and a cell marked with a hyphen (-) indicates a negligible value.






Table 10.   Data output from CPSM Los Angeles—Long Beach Incident scenario.  Compared to normal West Coast operations, a two-
week isolated incident reduces the annual West Coast ship throughput by 1 percent, or 61 ships, and containers by 2 
percent, or 136,471 TEUs.  Here, the Port of San Diego’s berth utilization rises to, on average, 0.63, signifying the 
terminal’s intensified activity.  Ocean carriers suffer in excess of $18.7 million in additional operating costs and $420 
million in container demurrage fees for frustrated cargo because of congestion caused by the influx of vessel diverts from 
Los Angeles and Long Beach to other ports.
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Ocean carriers that do berth at Long Beach, are likely to incur, overall, 
$7.7 million in additional operating charges, or $4,807 per ship (1,616 total ships), while 
Los Angeles ships will incur $4.67 million, or $4,806 per ship (971 total ships).  Harbor 
and port congestion also induce container demurrage fees to surge by 34 percent at Los 
Angeles ($67 million) and 28 percent ($38 million) at Long Beach.  The following 
section clarifies the capability of remaining West Coast infrastructure to accommodate 
ships and cargo diverted from Los Angeles and Long Beach. 
b. West Coast Effects 
Our results show that diverted ships and cargo from Los Angeles and 
Long Beach impose a significant challenge to the remaining West Coast infrastructure.  
Surges in berthing delays and queue lengths are evident, as terminal infrastructures strain 
to accommodate the increased arrival rate of ships (carrying many more TEUs) from  
Los Angeles and Long Beach.  San Diego’s infrastructure is overwhelmed, as the port’s 
berth utilization intensifies from 0.25 (normal) to 0.63 (see Table 10 and Figure 38), 
indicating the increased import activity at their eight container berths.  San Diego exhibits 
the most significant ship-to-berth delays (514 hours or 21 days) and a 92-ship backlog at 
a given point.  Ironically, San Diego’s annual vessel throughput falls by 51 percent (45 
vessels to 22 vessels) because, similar to all West Coast ports, San Diego is now 
servicing the TEU-heavy vessels from Los Angeles and Long Beach that generate ship 
and cargo congestion coastwide.  At the end of the 11-month simulation run,  
scenario-created congestion decreases the annual West Coast ship and container 
throughput by 1 percent (61 ships) and 2 percent (162,242 TEUs), respectively (i.e., these 
ships and containers remain stuck in the system at the end of our planning horizon; see 
Figure 39). 
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Figure 38.   Berth utilization of West Coast ports during normal operations and after 
an incident affecting the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.  San Diego’s 
berth utilization (black) value jumps from 0.25 to 0.63, indicating  
increased activity. 
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Figure 39.   This figure shows a 1 percent (61 vessel) reduction in annual West Coast 
ship throughput subsequent to an incident incapacitating the ports of  
Los Angeles and Long Beach for two weeks.  Similar analysis for container 
throughput revealed a 2 percent (162,242 TEUs) decrease in  
coastal throughput. 
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The remaining West Coast ports do not have the infrastructure to support 
the incapacitation of Los Angeles and Long Beach for even a two-week period.  Analysis 
shows a significant decrease in West Coast volume caused by over-congested harbors and 
incremental operating and cargo storage fees incurred by ocean carriers will exceed  
$439 million—a significant cost increase.  These figures do not reflect the financial 
impact to local, federal, and global economies nor the associated operating costs of ships 
and values of cargo stuck in the system at the end of a planning horizon. 
3. Oakland Earthquake 
a. Affected Ports 
Incapacitating the Port of Oakland (terminals and intermodal operations) 
for a two-week period induces heavy congestion (ship and cargo) throughout the  
San Francisco Bay area and Oakland Estuary.  The average wait time, for nondiverting 
ships, is observed to exceed 3.72 hours with a maximum delay of 372 hours (15 days) 
(see Table 11) and, at a given point, a 37-ship backlog and 9 (331 TEUs) container loads 
are simulated to await disposition.  Ship and container volume are observed dipping by  
4 percent (72 ships and 23,878 TEUs) and vessels that do call to Oakland (1,689 ships) 
will accrue in excess of $8.3 million in additional operating costs, or $4,959 per vessel, 
from congestion.  Finally, frustrated cargo demurrage fees will surge $25 million over 
our baseline figures.  The following section clarifies the capability of remaining  














For: Average Average Average Average Average Min Max Average Max Average Max
Long Beach          (Berth) 1,688 ± 3 - - 2,723,335 ± 4,101 0.25 ± 0.00 0.22 0.28 - - - -
(CY) - - 119,746 ± 405 - 0.14 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 - - - -
Los Angeles         (Berth) 1,085 ± 3 294.31 ± 5.24 - 3,481,347 ± 7,134 0.54 ± 0.00 0.46 0.62 0.02 ± 0.00 60.47 - 19
(CY) - - 152,593 ± 683 - 0.13 ± 0.00 0.11 0.15 - - - -
Oakland               (Berth) 1,689 ±  3 8,377 ± 120 - 559,139 ± 874 0.11 ± 0.00 0.10 0.13 3.72 ± 0.05 336.00 0.78 ± 0.01 37
(CY) - - 25,309 ± 121 - 0.08 ± 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.40 ± 0.02 336.00 0.08 ± 0.00 9
Portland                (Berth) 127.31 ±  0.71 3.70 ± 0.55 - 59,557 ± 340 0.09 ± 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.02 ± 0.00 30.22 - 3
(CY) - - 139.82 ± 2.18 - 0.03 ± 0.00 0.02 0.04 - - - -
Punta Colonet      (Berth) - - - - - - - - - - -
(CY) - - - - - - - - - - -
San Diego             (Berth) 45.52 ± 0.42 - - 41,191 ±  382 0.03 ± 0.00 0.01 0.05 - - - -
(CY) - - 576.12 ± 16.87 - 0.17 ± 0.00 0.10 0.26 1.74 ± 0.14 181.44 0.01 ± 0.00 4
Seattle                  (Berth) 702.79 ± 1.63 0.74 ± 0.42 - 611,522 ± 1,471 0.26 ± 0.00 0.21 0.30 - 17.48 - 4
(CY) - - 28,123 ± 161 - 0.09 ± 0.00 0.08 0.11 - - - -
Tacoma                  (Berth) 521.10 ± 1.41 11.6 ± 1.85 - 588,777 ±  1,614 0.30 ± 0.00 0.24 0.35 0.02 ± 0.00 36.90 - 6
(CY) - - 9,144 ± 60 - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.09 - - - -
Total West Coast  (Berth) 5,858 8,687 ± 120 - 8,064,870 ± 8,568 - - - - - - -
(CY) - - 335,633 ± 810 - - - - - - - -







Table 11.   Data output from the CPSM Oakland Earthquake scenario, which incapacitates Oakland for a two-week period.  The 
average delay in berthing Oakland vessels surges to 3.72 hours with a potential delay of 336 hours (14 days), which 
contributes to an expected 37-ship backlog.  As compared to baseline figures, Oakland’s congestion causes a 4 percent  
(72-ship) reduction in vessel throughput at the port from diverted vessels; however, the remaining West Coast 
infrastructure can accommodate such a crisis and annual inbound West Coast volume is not affected. 
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b. West Coast Effects 
Results show the existing West Coast infrastructure is able to 
accommodate an incident incapacitating Oakland for a two-week period (see Figure 40).  
Los Angeles’s substantial supporting infrastructure accommodates the 72 diverted vessels 
from Oakland with minimal impact to their own routine congestion.  Los Angeles is able 
absorb the Oakland diverts for two reasons—its infrastructure and service time.   
Los Angeles has a robust infrastructure including berths, container yard capacity, and 
supporting intermodal resources.  Second, despite a ship interarrival time of 4.55 hours, 
the smaller Oakland ships only carry, on average, 331 TEUs, while Los Angeles is 
accustomed to servicing Panamax ships carrying, on average, 3,416 TEUs. 
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Figure 40.   This figure shows the annual West Coast annual ship throughput 
subsequent to our CPSM modeled Transportation Security Incidents along the 
West Coast.  In comparison to the previous scenario, the remaining  
West Coast infrastructure can support diverting volume caused by a two-week 
incapacitation of Oakland.  Analysis shows similar results for  
container throughput. 
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4. Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
a. West Coast Effects 
Analysis reveals that a two-week, 25-percent reduction in West Coast 
seaport personnel inflicts minimal impact upon shipping operations.  Despite negligible 
average ship berthing delays, sporadic congestion stems from the random arrival and 
service times of vessels.  For example, at any given time, a ship bound for Los Angeles 
will be expected to wait up to 119.87 hours,  for Portland 41.90 hours, for Seattle  
33.52 hours, and for Tacoma 74.50 hours, with backlogs of 21 ships at Los Angeles and 













For: Average Average Average Average Average Min Max Average Max Average Max
Long Beach          (Berth) 1,685 ± 3 - - 2,720,064 ± 4,198 0.26 ± 0.00 0.23 0.29 - - - -
(CY) - - 119,536 ± 419 - 0.14 ± 0.00 0.13 0.15 - - - -
Los Angeles         (Berth) 1,013 ± 2 178.39 ± 34.86 - 3,458,938 ± 6,872 0.54 ± 0.00 0.48 0.63 0.13 ± 0.03 119.87 - 21
(CY) - - 151,235 ± 683 - 0.13 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 - - - -
Oakland               (Berth) 1,762 ± 3 - - 583,156 ± 857 0.11 ± 0.00 0.10 0.12 - - - -
(CY) - - - - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.08 - - - -
Portland                (Berth) 127.31 ± 0.70 7.92 ± 0.98 - 59,501 ± 330 0.09 ± 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.05 ± 0.01 41.90 - 3
(CY) - - 139.91 ± 2.20 - 0.04 ± 0.00 0.03 0.05 - - - -
Punta Colonet      (Berth) - - - - - - - - - - -
(CY) - - - - - - - - - - -
San Diego             (Berth) 45.15 ± 0.41 - - 40,818 ±  373 0.02 ± 0.00 0.01 0.04 - - - -
(CY) - - 513.35 ± 13.44 - 0.04 ± 0.00 0.02 0.08 - - - -
Seattle                  (Berth) 702.48 ± 1.73 5.83 ± 1.26 - 611,114 ± 1,532 0.26 ± 0.00 0.21 0.31 0.01 ± 0.00 33.52 - 6
(CY) - - 27,926 ± 166 - 0.01 ± 0.00 0.08 0.11 - - - -
Tacoma                  (Berth) 521.32 ± 1.41 64.77 ± 6.92 - 588,935 ±  1,629 0.31 ± 0.00 0.26 0.38 0.09 ± 0.01 74.50 - 10
(CY) - - 9,136 ± 62 - 0.08 ± 0.00 0.06 0.09 - - - -
Total West Coast  (Berth) 5,856 256.91 ± 35.92 - 8,062,529 ± 8,423 - - - - - - -
(CY) - - 308,488 ± 814 - - - - - - - -







Table 12.   Data output from the CPSM Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) scenario.  A total of 5,856 vessels 
call upon the West Coast and incur a total of $256,910 in incremental operating costs from sporadic congestion at terminal 
berths.  Coastwide, the average vessel wait time to berth is negligible; however, ships bound for the ports of Los Angeles, 
Portland, Seattle, and Tacoma, at a given point, will be expected to wait in excess of 33.52 hours.
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This congestion degrades annual West Coast ship and container through-
put by less than 1 percent (2 ships and 4,253 TEUs) (see Figure 41).  Collectively, in 
comparison to baseline figures, ocean carriers will incur an additional $227,880 (over 
5,856 ships) in operating costs, while container yard demurrage fees are not affected. 
Existing West Coast infrastructure has the capacity to offset the potential 
damaging affects from a reduction in support personnel.  Volume (i.e., ship and container 
throughput) and the incremental operating costs to shippers are marginally affected 
because of sporadic harbor congestion. 





















Figure 41.   West Coast vessel throughput subsequent to a 25-percent reduction in 
seaport manning for a period of two weeks. On average, the West Coast 
volume is degraded by an average of two ships that are absorbed, or stuck in 
the system, at simulation’s end.  Similar analysis reveals that container 
throughput is degraded by an average of 4,253 containers over the course of 
the simulation. 
5. International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) 
Lockout 
a. West Coast Effects 
Our analysis reveals, with the Mexican port of Punta Colonet inaccessible 
to shippers (recall ILWU-), the average berthing delays for ships exceed two hours 













For: Average Average Average Average Average Min Max Average Max Average Max
Long Beach          (Berth) 1,638 ± 3 5,127 ± 73 - 2,644,580 ± 4,141 0.26 ± 0.00 0.23 0.28 2.35 ± 0.03 239.99 0.48 ± 0.01 38
(CY) - - 145,416 ± 593 - 0.14 ± 0.00 0.13 0.15 1.35 ± 0.03 240.00 0.27 ± 0.01 28
Los Angeles         (Berth) 983.01 ± 1.89 3,152 ± 55 - 3,357,465 ± 6,530 0.54 ± 0.00 0.46 0.62 2.41 ± 0.04 240.00 0.29 ± 0.01 23
(CY) - - 191,925 ± 1,008 - 0.13 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 2.07 ± 0.04 239.98 0.25 ± 0.00 28
Oakland               (Berth) 1,707 ± 3 5,398 ± 71 - 565,104 ± 863 0.11 ± 0.00 0.10 0.13 2.37 ± 0.03 240.00 0.51 ± 0.01 35
(CY) - - 4,109 ± 57 - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.26 ± 0.01 240.00 0.05 ± 0.00 14
Portland                (Berth) 122.82 ± 0.69 388.42 ± 19.91 - 57,461 ± 333 0.09 ± 0.00 0.06 0.13 2.38 ± 0.12 243.20 0.04 ± 0.00 6
(CY) - - 156.31 ± 2.49 - - - - 0.09 ± 0.03 239.91 - 2
Punta Colonet      (Berth) - - - - - - - - - - -
(CY) - - - - - - - - - - -
San Diego             (Berth) 44.47 ± 0.42 132.94 ± 11.67 - 40,279 ±  383 0.02 ± 0.00 0.01 0.04 2.23 ± 0.20 239.89 0.01 ± 0.00 4
(CY) - - 649.61 ± 18.30 - 0.05 ± 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.17 ± 0.06 238.56 - 2
Seattle                  (Berth) 682.67 ± 1.57 2,165 ± 47 - 593,938 ± 1,389 0.26 ± 0.00 0.21 0.31 2.38 ± 0.05 239.99 0.20 ± 0.00 19
(CY) - - 33,424 ± 218 - 0.09 ± 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.70 ± 0.03 240.00 0.06 ± 0.00 9
Tacoma                  (Berth) 505.35 ± 1.42 1,614 ± 41 - 570,865 ±  1,627 0.31 ± 0.00 0.24 0.37 2.40 ± 0.06 266.35 0.15 ± 0.00 17
(CY) - - 10,308  ± 70 - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.84 ± 0.04 239.99 0.09 ± 0.00 8
Total West Coast  (Berth) 5,684 17,978 ± 128 - 7,829,694 ± 8,161 - - - - - - -
(CY) - - 385,990 ± 1,156 - - - - - - - -
Note: CY stands for container yard and a cell marked with a hyphen (-) indicates a negligible value.






Table 13.   Data output from CPSM ILWU Lockout (-) scenario.  The Mexican port of Punta Colonet is inaccessible to ships during 
this scenario.  Significant ship and cargo congestion is caused by the 10-day ILWU lockout along the West Coast.  The 
annual West Coast volume dips by 3 percent due to ships still waiting at the end of a planning horizon.  The system absorbs 
the 175 vessels and 237,088 containers not serviced by the model at end of the simulation time.  Shippers incur $18 million 
in additional operating costs and $385 million in cargo storage fees.
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We observe heavy coastal congestion to include 38 ships and 28  
(1,614 TEUs) container loads that are simulated to await disposition at Long Beach.  
Additionally, the ports of Long Beach, Los Angeles, and Oakland each suffer 3-percent 
reductions in annual throughput (Long Beach:  50 ships, 80,767 TEUs, Los Angeles:   
29 ships, 100,343 TEUs, and Oakland:  54 ships, 17,913 TEUs), respectively. 
As a whole, West Coast ship and container throughput bottlenecks and is 
degraded by 3 percent (175 ships, 237,088 TEUs; see Figure 42), incremental operating 
costs incurred by the 5,684 ocean carriers equates to $3,162 per vessel or $17.9 million 
and cargo demurrage fees increase 22 percent (in comparison to baseline) to  
$385 million.  The total cost incurred to ocean carriers for a 10-day labor union dispute 
equates to $403 million, the second most significant cost encountered in all of  
our scenarios. 




























Figure 42.   This figure illustrates the effects of our modeled scenarios upon  
West Coast ship throughput.  The ILWU (-) (“-“ indicating Punta Colonet is 
inaccessible to shippers) scenario results in a 3-percent (174 vessels) decrease 
in annual vessel throughput. 
Conversely, with Punta Colonet as an option for shippers (recall, ILWU+), 
analysis shows that the 175 vessels system previously absorbed by the system (ILWU-) 
will divert to Punta Colonet (see Figure 43). 
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Figure 43.   Snapshot of ILWU+ scenario within Arena.  West Coast-bound vessels  
(1) divert to Punta Colonet, significant cargo (2) and ship (3) congestion 
forms along the coast, and (4) cargo offloaded in Mexico is shipped back to 
U.S metropolitan areas. 
These 175 vessels (on average) and associated containers constitute  
3 percent of the annual U.S. West Coast volume.  Ocean carriers calling upon Punta 
Colonet will incur an additional $2.49 million ($14,108 per vessel) in incremental 
operating costs from the extended Baja California transit; however, Punta Colonet serves 
as a “relief valve” during the 10-day lockout as 8.06 million TEUs transition from U.S. 
West Coast ports.  This container throughput figure is the most significant value 













For: Average Average Average Average Average Min Max Average Max Average Max
Long Beach          (Berth) 1,635 ± 3 5,127 ± 73 - 2,639,446 ± 4,171 0.26 ± 0.00 0.23 0.29 2.35 ± 0.03 239.99 0.48 ± 0.01 38
(CY) - - 144,885 ± 588 - 0.13 ± 0.00 0.12 0.15 1.35 ± 0.03 240.00 0.27 ± 0.01 32
Los Angeles         (Berth) 983.75 ± 1.98 3,155 ± 55 - 3,359,683 ± 6,897 0.54 ± 0.00 0.47 0.63 2.41 ± 0.04 240.00 0.30 ± 0.01 23
(CY) - - 192,472 ± 995 - 0.13 ± 0.00 0.11 0.15 2.07 ± 0.04 239.98 0.25 ± 0.00 28
Oakland               (Berth) 1,707 ± 3 5,398 ± 71 - 564,972 ± 867 0.11 ± 0.00 0.10 0.12 2.37 ± 0.03 240.00 0.51 ± 0.01 35
(CY) - - 4,110 ± 57 - 0.06 ± 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.26 ± 0.01 240 0.06 ± 0.0 13
Portland                (Berth) 122.72 ± 0.68 388.70 ± 19.88 - 57,401 ± 326 0.09 ± 0.00 0.06 0.14 2.38 ± 0.12 243.20 0.04 ± 0.00 6
(CY) - - 156.78 ± 2.58 - - - - 0.09 ± 0.03 239.91 - 3
Punta Colonet      (Berth) 175.32 ± 0.84 2,469 ± 19 - 241,504 ± 1,522 0.04 ± 0.00 0.02 0.05 11.54 ± 0.61 139.43 0.26 ± 0.01 76
(CY) - - 175.88 ± 1.93 - - - - - - - -
San Diego             (Berth) 44.29 ± 0.42 132.94 ± 11.67 - 40,070 ±  385 0.02 ± 0.00 0.01 0.04 2.26 ± 0.20 239.89 0.01 ± 0.00 4
(CY) - - 646.85 ± 18.13 - 0.04 ± 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.17 ± 0.06 238.56 - 2
Seattle                  (Berth) 681.89 ± 1.65 2,165 ± 47 - 593,420 ± 1,473 0.26 ± 0.00 0.22 0.31 2.38 ± 0.05 239.99 0.20 ± 0.00 19
(CY) - - 33,363 ± 213 - 0.09 ± 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.70 ± 0.03 240.00 0.05 ± 0.00 9
Tacoma                  (Berth) 505.48 ± 1.38 1,614 ± 41 - 571,198 ± 1,603 0.31 ± 0.00 0.25 0.37 2.39 ± 0.06 266.35 0.15 ± 0.00 17
(CY) - - 10,318 ± 71 - 0.07 ± 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.83 ± 0.04 239.99 0.05 ± 0.00 8
Total West Coast  (Berth) 5,855 20,449 ± 130 - 8,067,694 ± 8,507 - - - - - - -
(CY) - - 386,130 ± 1,157 - - - - - - - -
Note: CY stands for container yard and a cell marked with a hyphen (-) indicates a negligible value.






Table 14.   Data output from CPMS ILWU (+) scenario.  The Port of Punta Colonet, Mexico services on average 175 West Coast-
bound ships during the lockout.  With Punta Colonet accessible to shippers, West Coast container throughput records the 
highest value encountered in all of our scenarios (8.06 million).  However, the extended transit time to Punta Colonet 
increases the incremental operating costs of shippers by $20.4 million, or $3,492 per ship.
 64
TSI Effects Upon West Coast Container Throughput





























Figure 44.   This figure shows the West Coast container throughput for all scenarios 
modeled.  With Punta Colonet accessible to West Coast-bound vessels 
(ILWU+), the annual container throughput of 8.06 million TEUs is the most 
significant value encountered in all scenarios. 
A labor dispute along the U.S. West Coast inflicts significant congestion 
to ports and terminals.  West Coast volume is degraded by 3 percent and incremental 
costs to shippers exceed $400 million.  However, the proposed Mexican mega-port of 
Punta Colonet would serve as a viable option for shippers to ensure the unimpeded 
continuity of operations of the West Coast shipping industry subsequent to a TSI. 
C. SUMMATION 
 Even under normal operating conditions, ocean carriers are susceptible to 
sporadic harbor and terminal congestion stemming from the random arrival rates and 
times to unload and load container ships.  Larger ports with higher traffic intensities such 
as Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Oakland are renowned for such congestion; however, 
analysis reveals smaller Pacific Northwest ports with less infrastructure are  
similarly challenged. 
An incident simultaneously incapacitating the ports of Los Angeles and  
Long Beach for an extended period of time places a considerable strain on the remaining 
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West Coast infrastructure.  Our analysis reveals the additional congestion and inability of 
remaining West Coast seaports to accommodate such volume can be expected to cost 
ocean carriers upwards of $439 million for operating and cargo storage fees alone.  Our 
modeling does not take into account the secondary and tertiary effects on local, national, 
and global economies. 
Our results show that incapacitating the Port of Oakland or a moderate reduction 
in West Coast seaport personnel for a two-week period will inflict minimal impact to the 
West Coast shipping industry.  Los Angeles’s robust infrastructure and proximity to the 
Port of Oakland can easily accommodate diverted vessels and cargo, while minimizing 
the incremental costs to ocean carriers and the impact upon adjacent  
coastal infrastructure. 
A labor union dispute, paralyzing the operations of the West Coast shipping 
industry, inflicts considerable congestion to seaports, substantial incremental costs to 
shippers, and presumably also poses significant financial setbacks to local, national, and 
global economies.  However, the availability of the a proposed Mexican mega-port would 
serve as a viable option for shippers to ensure the unimpeded continuity of operations of 
the West Coast shipping industry subsequent to a TSI. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis introduces the CPSM, which can be used to estimate the effects of 
congestion on U.S. West Coast container ports and shipper costs subsequent to a TSI.  By 
constraining the model with abnormal conditions, we are able to identify seaport and 
intermodal congestive areas that are potential bottlenecks and, thus, are vulnerable to a 
TSI.  Such infrastructure vulnerabilities threaten our maritime shipping capacities and are 
candidates for incremental commercial investments or government subsidies. 
Six representative hypothetical West Coast scenarios have been analyzed.  We 
conclude that West Coast ocean carriers are subject to sporadic congestion and 
incremental demurrage fees beyond normal routine.  This congestion is attributable to the 
random arrivals, servicing, and varying load dimensions of the modern-day shipping 
industry.  We determine there is insufficient West Coast infrastructure to accommodate 
an event incapacitating the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach beyond a two-week 
period.  Such an event would render a strain so significant that annual West Coast volume 
could be expected to decrease by 2 percent (61 ships and 136,471 TEUs), with 
incremental expenses to ocean carriers exceeding $439 million.  Conversely, the  
West Coast has sufficient infrastructure in place to accommodate crises incapacitating the 
Port of Oakland or a coastwide administrative reduction in seaport personnel.  Lastly, we 
find a labor union dispute the most significant threat to the vitality of the West Coast 
shipping industry.  We find a 10-day dispute reduces the annual West Coast volume by 
3% (175 ships and 237,088 TEUs) and inflicts additional expenses exceeding  
$400 million on shippers. 
Follow-on work can include improving the model’s scalability (i.e., reducing the 
number of Arena modules required), while enhancing model logic to include additional 
intermodal and transportation modes as influenced and directed by experts of intermodal 
planning and transportation systems. 
 Additions to the model might also include the development and analysis of 
additional ocean-carrier concepts to include strategic and domestic commodities and 
cargoes (e.g., bulk, break-bulk, and petroleum). 
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 Finally, synchronizing the model with an optimization package such as OptQuest 
(Arena, 2008) within Arena can assist CPSM in determining optimal routing decisions 
for diverted vessels and approximate locations for additional seaport infrastructure 
investments.  This can be done by defining various inputs and constraints (e.g., cost, 
distance, or capacity) and desired outputs in the form of an objective function and 
expressing binary options to enhance infrastructure.  OptQuest then performs heuristic 
local search, using the simulation model to evaluate candidate designs, hoping to  
discover improvements. 
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APPENDIX A. CPSM ENTITY CREATION STAGE 
 
Figure 45.   The first stage of CPSM creates ship entities for each seaport of our 
research and assigns each a port-of-call and animation properties.  This stage 
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APPENDIX B. CPSM PORT ROUTING LOGIC STAGE 
Characteristics

















Best Estimate Time? and Port
Best Est Time
Port Routing Logic Stage
 
Figure 46.   The second stage of CPSM simulates our seaport routing logic in case a ship needs to choose an alternate destination 
subsequent to a TSI.  This stage is presented in three substages within Chapter III.
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Figure 47.   The third stage of CPSM simulates the ship berthing and container yard operations of the shipping industry.  This stage 
is presented in three substages within Chapter III.  This stage is voluminous.  For exposition, modules representing only the 
Port of Seattle are presented.
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APPENDIX D. CPSM LANDSIDE ROUTING LOGIC STAGE 
As s i g n  At t ri b u te s
Re g i o n s  a n d
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Figure 48.   The fourth stage of CPSM simulates cargo routing from seaport terminals to metropolitan areas throughout the United 
States.  This stage is presented in three substages within Chapter III.
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APPENDIX E. CPSM ANIMATION 
 
Figure 49.   Container Port Simulation Model (CPSM) animation within Arena.  The animation shows ship icons arriving to  
West Coast seaports and the subsequent accumulation of container cargo (black boxes).  Containers are ultimately trucked 
to destinations throughout the United States.
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